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FOR MICE OR MEN OR CHILDREN? WILL
THE EXPANSION OF THE EIGHTH
AMENDMENT IN A TKINS V. VIRGINIA
FORCE THE SUPREME COURT TO RE-
EXAMINE THE MINIMUM AGE FOR THE
DEATH PENALTY?
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)
I. INTRODUCTION
In May 2003, the United States Supreme Court removed mentally
retarded criminals from eligibility for the death penalty during sentencing
proceedings. Basing its decision upon the recent trend of legislation in
various states removing retarded offenders from their sentencing schemes,
the Court in Atkins v. Virginia expanded the Court's Eighth Amendment
"cruel and unusual punishment" jurisprudence. The phrase "cruel and
unusual" evolves along with society's values and the Court looks to
objective indicia such as legislation and jury verdicts to determine when a
"national consensus" has developed against a practice. When the Court
finds that such a "consensus" exists, the practice is determined to be "cruel
and unusual punishment" and thus unconstitutional. In Atkins, the Court
continued their policy of looking outside of its walls and into society to find
that the combination of recently enacted legislation, jury verdicts, the
statements of international, religious and professional organizations, and
polling data indicated a "national consensus" against executing mentally
retarded offenders. While the Court's method follows precedent, the result
does not. The "national consensus" in Atkins is far weaker than any that has
been previously relied upon to strike down a sentencing scheme under the
Eighth Amendment. The Court has lowered its standards for defining a
"national consensus," and this decision will have substantial future
implications. With this new lower standard, the Court should accept
certiorari for an age-related appeal and re-examine the minimum age of
eligibility for the death penalty.
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II. BACKGROUND: THE EVOLVING STANDARD OF THE EIGHTH
AMENDMENT'S PROHIBITION ON CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
A. THE BEGINNING OF THE COURT'S MODERN ANALYSIS OF THE
EIGHT AMENDMENT
1. Weems v. United States
In Weems v. United States,' the Court found that it was "cruel and
unusual punishment" under the Eighth Amendment2 to sentence a man
convicted of falsifying two public documents to "twelve years and one day,
a chain at the ankle and wrist of the offender, hard and painful labor, no
assistance from friend or relative, no marital authority or parental rights or
rights of property, no participation even in the family council. 3 The Court
wrote that such a punishment offended Americans' belief that "it is a
precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and
proportioned to offense."4 The Court acknowledged that the Framers of the
Bill of Rights and the members of Congress who passed the Bill explicitly
left the term "cruel and unusual punishment" without a strict definition.5
The lack of a confined definition has allowed the Court to look beyond the
original intent of the drafters and has forced the Constitution to evolve.
"Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes.
Therefore a principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than
the mischief which gave it birth.",6 Constitutions are "'designed to approach
immortality as nearly as human institutions can approach it.' ... In the
application of a constitution, therefore, our contemplation cannot be only of
what has been but of what may be."7 By allowing the Constitution to
evolve along with society and demonstrating the battle between the
legislative and judicial branches, this decision set the tone for the
development of Eighth Amendment "cruel and unusual" jurisprudence.
' 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
2 "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
3 Weems, 217 U.S. at 366.
4 Id. at 366-67.
5 See id. at 368-69.
6 Id. at 373.
7 id.
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2. Trop v. Dulles
In Trop v. Dulles,8 the Court decided that Section 401(g) of the
Nationality Act of 1940 violated the Eighth Amendment as "cruel and
unusual punishment." 9 The Act allowed for the citizenship rights to be
revoked from a deserter of the armed forces who was court-martialed and
dishonorably discharged.1° Chief Justice Warren recognized the inherent
vagueness of the terms "cruel and unusual," but instead of inserting a rigid
definition, the Court stated that the meaning must be found in the "evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."'1 1 In
deciding what constituted "evolving standards of decency," the Court
looked to international law. 12 The reality of a punishment such as loss of
citizenship was not physical, but instead, stripped the offender of all
political rights and left him stateless. 13  At the time of this decision,
denationalization was the punishment for desertion in only two other
countries, the Philippines and Turkey. 14 These statistics led the Court to
declare denationalization "a fate universally decried by civilized people,"
thereby establishing that it did not fall within the "standard of decency."
15
' 356 U.S. 86 (1957).
9 Id. at 101. The text of section 401(g) read:
A person who is a national of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his
nationality by ... (g) Deserting the military or naval forces of the United States in time of war,
provided he is convicted thereof by court martial and as the result of such conviction is dismissed
or dishonorably discharged from the service of such military or naval forces: Provided, That
notwithstanding loss of nationality or citizenship or civil or political rights under the terms of
this or previous Acts by reason of desertion committed in time of war, restoration to active duty
with such military or naval forces in time of war or the reenlistment or induction of such a person
in time of war with permission of competent military or naval authority, prior or subsequent to
the effective date of this Act, shall be deemed to have the immediate effect of restoring such
nationality or citizenship and all civil and political rights heretofore or hereafter so lost and of
removing all civil and political disabilities resulting therefrom ....
Id. at 88 n.1 (citing Nationality Act of 1940 § 401(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(8) (2002)).
'0 Id. at 88.
Id. at 101.
12 See id. at 102.
'3 Id. at 101.
14 Id. at 103.
15 Id. at 102.
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B. DEATH PENALTY AND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT-THE
CONSENSUS ANALYSIS
1. Coker v. Georgia-Death Penalty for a Crime less than Murder
In Coker v. Georgia,'6 the Court struck down a Georgia statute that
allowed persons convicted of rape to be sentenced to death. 7 The Court
found that there was a consensus against the proportionality of this
punishment within the United States and around the world.' 8 Following
Furman v. Georgia, 9 only three out of sixteen states that had revised their
death penalty sentencing schemes to ensure constitutionality included death
as an available sentence for a rape conviction. 20  No state that had
previously excluded death for a rape conviction imposed the penalty in their
new statute.2' Nineteen states had recently enacted death penalty statutes
and none of them had included rape as a capital offense.22 Overall, at the
time of this decision, Georgia was the only jurisdiction that allowed a death
sentence to be imposed upon an individual convicted of the rape of an adult
woman.
23
Beyond the legislation relating to rape and the death penalty, the Court
considered jury verdicts persuasive in finding a national consensus against
imposing a death sentence for rape.24 In Georgia, nine out of ten juries had
not imposed death on a convicted rapist.25 These two considerations led the
Court to find that death was a "grossly disproportionate and excessive
punishment for the crime of rape and ... therefore forbidden by the Eighth
Amendment as cruel and unusual punishment."
26
16 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
i7 ld.at 592.
I' d. at 593-95.
'9 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). In Furman, the Court decided that the death
penalty was unconstitutional due to the arbitrary nature in which it was being applied. Id. at
295 (Brennan, J., concurring).
20 Coker, 433 U.S. at 594. North Carolina and Louisiana had statutes that made death the
mandatory sentence for the crime of rape. Both of these statutes were invalidated by
Woodson v. North Carolina, which required individualized consideration for death to be
imposed. Id.; see Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976); Roberts v.
Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 336 (1976). When both of these states revamped their death
penalty statutes again, rape was not included as a capital offense. Coker, 433 U.S. at 594.
21 Coker, 433 U.S. at 594.
22 Id. at 595.
23 Id. at 595-96.
24 Id. at 596.
25 Id. at 597.
26 Id. at 592.
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2. Enmund v. Florida-Culpability and the Death Penalty
In Enmund v. Florida,27 the Court declared unconstitutional a Florida
statute that allowed persons who had been convicted of felony murder but
had "neither [taken] life, attempted to take life, nor intended to take life" to
be sentenced to death.28 The Court followed the pattern of reasoning
established in Coker.2 9 The Court first analyzed various state laws with
respect to punishment of an offender such as Enmund.3 ° It found that only
eight states expressly permitted such an offender to be given a sentence of
death. 3' The Court recognized that the legislation did not reflect a
unanimous condemnation of such punishment and as such was not
dispositive; instead it found the state laws to be a factor of substantial
weight. 32 The Court then looked to the sentencing patterns of juries to shed
light on society's reaction to the death penalty in the case of felony
murder.33 It found that only six people (all executed prior to 1955) out of
the 362 executed since 1954 had been convicted as a non-triggerman felony
murderer.34 These two factors combined to establish a consensus against
the death penalty for an offender who did not kill nor contemplate death
during the offense.
35
3. Thompson v. Oklahoma-Age and the Death Penalty
In Thompson v. Oklahoma,36 the Court held that a national consensus
existed against the execution of an offender who was under the age of
sixteen at the time of the offense.37 In 1988, fourteen states did not allow
any kinds of executions and nineteen states did not specify a minimum age
27 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
28 Id. at 787.
29 Id. at 788-89.
30 Id. at 789-93.
31 Id. at 792. This statistic was disputed by the dissent. The dissent interpreted the
language of the statutes in thirty-one states as allowing "a sentencer to impose a death
sentence for a death that occurs during the course of a robbery." Id. at 819 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
32 Id. at 792-93. The Court juxtaposed this situation to Coker and decided that the
various state legislation were less persuasive in this case. Id.
13 Id. at 794.
34 Id. at 794-95. Again the Court compared these results to those in Coker; however, the
evidence ofjury verdicts for non-triggerman felony murder was far more persuasive than the
verdicts involving those executed for rape. Id.
31 See id. at 789-96.
36 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
37 Id. at 824-25.
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in their death penalty statutes.38 The remaining eighteen states had
established a minimum age and "all of them require[d] that the defendant
have attained at least the age of 16 at the time of the capital offense., 39 The
Court also stated that professional organizations and the international
community decried such punishment.4 °
In this case, the Court did not hold that a national consensus against
the punishment was enough to be "cruel and unusual punishment"; instead
they looked beyond the objective indicia to the culpability of juvenile
offenders.4' Prior court precedent stated that, based on juveniles'
"[i]nexperience, less education, and less intelligence," they were inherently
less culpable than adults for crimes of similar magnitude.42 This diminished
culpability led the Court to conclude that the principle of retribution was
not served by sentencing an offender under the age of sixteen to death.43
4. Stanford v. Kentucky-Age and the Death Penalty Revisited
In Stanford v. Kentucky,44 the Court again confronted the issue of a
minimum age of eligibility for the death penalty. 45 The plurality opinion,
written by Justice Scalia, determined that there was not a national
consensus against the execution of sixteen or seventeen-year-old
offenders.46 The fact that fifteen states did not impose death upon anyone
under the age of seventeen and twelve states set the bar at eighteen did not
meet the Court's requirement for a national consensus. 47 The individualized
consideration given to age as a mitigating circumstance was enough to
ensure that an offender was properly culpable for the death penalty.48 The
lack of a national consensus was enough to preclude the Court from looking
at outside sources such as public interest polls and the views of professional
i Id. at 826-27.
9 Id. at 829.
40 Id. at 830-31.
4' Id. at 833.
42 Id. at 835.
43 Id. at 836-37.
4' 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
41 Id. at 380.
46 Id. at 377.
47 Id. at 370-71. The dissent (written by Justice Brennan and joined by Justices
Blackmun, Marshall and Stevens) viewed these statistics differently and found a national
consensus against sentencing offenders under eighteen to death. id. at 384-85 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
48 Id. at 374-75.
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organizations. 49  "[O]ur job is to identify the 'evolving standards of
decency'; to determine, not what they should be, but what they are.
' 50
5. Penry v. Lynaugh-Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty
Prior to the Court's decision in Atkins, Penry v. Lynaugh51 set the
standard for the treatment of mentally retarded people under death penalty
sentencing statutes. In Penry, the Court5 2 decided that it was not "cruel and
unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to execute a mentally
retarded person with Penry's reasoning ability." 53  Looking back to
common law, the Court stated that it would be "cruel and unusual" to allow
the execution of those who are "profoundly or severely retarded and wholly
lacking the capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of their actions.' '5 At
the time of the Penry decision, only the federal government and the state of
Georgia had statutes that specifically excluded mentally retarded
individuals from eligibility for the death penalty.55 The Court did not
consider this to be a national consensus, even when combining these two
jurisdictions with the fourteen that outlawed the death penalty altogether. 6
Beyond legislation, the Court looked at whether the application of the
death penalty to mentally retarded offenders accomplished the goals of
retribution and deterrence.57 The Court held that, because almost every
state sentencing statute allowed the jury to consider the capacity of the
49 Id. at 377. Justice O'Connor in a concurrence and the dissent disagreed with this
contention and would have used these outside sources as indicative of society's values. Id.
at 380-81 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 388 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
50 Id. at 378 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
"' 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
52 The majority opinion was written by Justice O'Connor and the sections relevant to
mental retardation were joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, White, and
Kennedy.
53 Penry, 492 U.S. at 313. Penry was determined to have the mental age of a 6V2 year old
with the social ability of a nine or ten year old. He had never completed the first grade, and
his aunt struggled for over a year to teach him to print his own name. Id. at 307-09.
54 Id. at 333. The Court bases this on the common law rule that "idiots and lunatics are
not chargeable for their own acts, if committed when under these incapacities." Id. at 331
(quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 24-25). The Court states that severely or
profoundly mentally retarded people are the modem equivalent of a common law idiot. Id.
at 332-33.
55 Id. at 334. The Court noted that Maryland had passed a similar statute that had not yet
taken effect. Id.
56 Id. at 334.
7 Id. at 335-36.
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defendant to appreciate the criminality of the offense as a mitigating factor,
the offender's culpability was considered. 58
The majority was troubled by the heterogeneity of the class of
individuals characterized as "mentally retarded., 59 The Court expressed
concern about when mental retardation was serious enough to warrant
exclusion from the death penalty, noting that education and habilitation
60
could lessen some of the symptomatic effects of retardation. Justice
61Brennan disagreed, stating that "there are characteristics as to which there
is no danger of spurious generalization because they are a part of the
clinical definition of mental retardation. 62 Brennan also questioned the
effectiveness of the death penalty as a retributive device against the
mentally retarded.63 He characterized the impairment of a mentally retarded
offender as so limiting on their culpability that "the ultimate penalty of
death is always and necessarily disproportionate to his or her
blameworthiness and hence unconstitutional., 64  Brennan argued that
because mentally retarded individuals have difficulty anticipating the
consequences of their actions and have a diminished ability to control their
impulses, the death penalty as a punishment serves no deterrent purpose and
becomes "nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of
pain and suffering."
65
After recognizing that mental retardation may in fact reduce
culpability, the majority declined to exclude all mentally retarded offenders
from eligibility for the death penalty. 66 However, the majority left the door
open for future reconsideration by stating, "[w]hile a national consensus
against execution of the mentally retarded may someday emerge reflecting
the 'evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
8 Id. at 337.
9 See id. at 338-39.
I d. at 338.
61 Three separate dissents were written in this case. However, only two of the dissenting
opinions disagreed with the majority on issues relevant to this case note. The dissent cited
here was written by Justice Brennan and joined by Justice Marshall. The other was written
by Justice Stevens and joined by Justice Blackmun.
62 Penry, 492 U.S. at 344 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent would have adopted the
definition of mental retardation proffered by the American Association on Mental
Retardation in an amicus brief. Id. at 344-45 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
63 Id. at 348 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
64 Id. at 346 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
65 Id. at 349 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592
(1977)).
66 Id. at 340.
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society,' there is insufficient evidence of such a consensus today., 67 Eleven
years later, however, the Court re-examined this exact issue.
III. ATKINS V. VIRGINIA
A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On August 18, 1996, Daryl Renard Atkins and William Jones abducted
Eric Nesbitt, robbed him of the money on his body, and then drove him to
an ATM machine and forced him to withdraw more cash.68 They then
drove Nesbitt to an isolated location and shot him eight times.69 The
cameras at the ATM recorded their picture, leading to their arrest.70 Jones
pled to first degree murder in exchange for his testimony against Atkins and
a life sentence. 7' During the sentencing phase of Atkins's trial, both Atkins
and Jones testified, agreeing on most of the important details but each
alleging that the other had pulled the trigger.72 The jury believed Jones,
whose testimony the Court characterized as "both more coherent and
credible than Atkins's [testimony]. 73 Atkins's testimony was discredited
by the fact that his statements at trial varied greatly from his statement to
the police after the arrest.
74
B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1. The First Sentencing Hearing
In the sentencing phase of Atkins's trial, the state presented his prior
convictions for assault and robbery to prove future dangerousness. 75 The
trial record itself, including the autopsy report and pictures of Nesbitt's
body, was used as another aggravating factor.76 Atkins called only one
witness, a forensic psychologist, Dr. Evan Nelson, who testified that Atkins
was "mildly mentally retarded., 77 This classification was based upon a
review of school and court records, interviews of people associated with
67 Id. (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
68 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 307 (2002).
69 id.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 307 n.1.
72 Id. at 307.
73 id.
74 Id. at 307 n.2.





Atkins, and an intelligence test showing that Atkins had a full scale IQ of
59.78 After hearing this evidence, the jury was not convinced that Atkins's
retardation mitigated his culpability and returned a verdict of death.79
2. The Second Sentencing Hearing
The Virginia Supreme Court ordered another sentencing hearing
because the trial court used a misleading jury verdict form. 80 The defense
again called Dr. Nelson to testify about Atkins's mental abilities. 8' This
time the state presented its own doctor, who testified that "Atkins was not
mentally retarded, but rather was of 'average intelligence at least,' and
diagnosable as having antisocial personality disorder., 82 The jury again
sentenced Atkins to death, unconvinced that Atkins's retardation mitigated
his culpability enough to reduce the maximum penalty.
83
3. The Virginia Supreme Court decision
Atkins' attorneys appealed the second death sentence to the Virginia
Supreme Court under the theory that Atkins was not eligible to be
sentenced to death because of his mental retardation. 4 The court reviewed
the sentence for proportionality of "the penalty [to that] imposed in similar
cases, considering both the crime and the defendant., 85  Basing their
decision on Penry, a divided court upheld the sentence.86 The majority
recognized that the Penry decision required consideration of an individual's
mental retardation as a mitigating factor, but did not allow retardation alone
to exempt an individual from eligibility for the death penalty.
87
Under the Virginia sentencing scheme, the jury could consider mental
retardation as a mitigating factor in capital murder cases. 88 The jury was
presented with conflicting expert opinions as to Atkins's retardation, and
determination of the credibility of these witnesses was the role of the finder
78 Id. at 308-09.





84 Atkins v. Virginia, 534 S.E.2d 312, 318 (Va. 2000), cert. granted, 533 U.S. 976
(2001).
85 Id.; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-313(C) (2003).
86 Atkins, 534 S.E.2d at 321.
87 id. at 319-20.
88 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(B) (2000 & Supp. 2003).
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of fact.89 Thus, the majority held that the jury had properly considered this
testimony and upheld their sentence of death. 90
Justices Hassell and Koontz dissented from the majority opinion.
Hassell's opinion (in which Koontz joined) went through a complete review
of the record of the case and picked apart the expert testimony given by
both parties' witnesses.9' He concluded that the state's witness, Dr.
Samenow, had not completely tested Atkins and thus his testimony was far
less credible.92 Hassell opined that Atkins' case was distinguishable from
the Penry decision because it was not a constitutional question but was to
be considered under section 17.1-313(C) of the Virginia Code as
"disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar crimes, considering both
the crime and the defendant. 93 Justice Koontz wrote separately to make a
more philosophical argument against sentencing a mentally retarded
individual to death.94 Koontz stated that "it is indefensible to conclude that
individuals who are mentally retarded are not to some degree less culpable
for their criminal acts."95 Both of these opinions advocated the reduction of
Atkins's sentence to life without the possibility of parole.96
Atkins appealed this decision to the United States Supreme Court. The
Court granted certiorari based on the serious concern expressed by the
dissenting justices on the Virginia Supreme Court. 97 In light of the shift in
the legislative landscape, the Court thought it proper to re-examine the
Penry decision and reconsider the eligibility of mentally retarded offenders
for the death penalty.
98
C. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
1. The Majority Opinion
Relying on long-standing precedent, Justice Stevens, writing for the
majority,99 opines that the Eighth Amendment "must draw its meaning from
89 Atkins, 534 S.E.2d at 319-20.
90 Id. at 321.
91 Id. at 323-24 (Hassell, J., dissenting).
92 Id. at 324 (Hassell, J., dissenting).
93 Id. (Hassell, J., dissenting).
94 Id. at 324-25 (Koontz, J., dissenting).
95 Id. at 325 (Koontz, J., dissenting).
96 Id. at 323 (Hassell, J., dissenting); id at 325 (Koontz, J., dissenting).
97 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 310 (2002).
98 id.
99 The majority opinion is written by Justice Stevens and joined by Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy, Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer.
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the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society."'0 0  Legislation is the best objective measure of where the
"standard of decency" lies within today's society.' 0' Where a national
consensus has developed against a certain behavior or punishment, the
Court "ha[s] no reason to disagree with that judgment for purposes of
construing and applying the Eighth Amendment."''0 2  However, "the
objective evidence, though of great importance, [does] not 'wholly
determine' the controversy .... Instead, the Constitution requires the
Court to impose its own judgment in cases where there is a consensus "by
asking whether there is reason to disagree with the judgment reached by the
citizenry and its legislators."'
0 4
The majority first examines the recent legislation passed regarding the
treatment of mentally retarded individuals under various states' sentencing
schemes. 10 5 The Court juxtaposes the legislative situation now with what
existed at the time of the Penry decision.' 0 6  In 1989, only the federal
government and the state of Georgia had statutes prohibiting the execution
of mentally retarded individuals. 10 7 Since this decision was handed down
(and possibly in reaction to it), eighteen states have enacted similar
legislation. 108 "It is not so much the number of these States that is
significant, but the consistency of the direction of the change."' 0 9 This
legislation is particularly compelling given the increase in anti-crime
legislation and the decline of laws granting rights to those convicted of
crimes." 0  Further, the eighteen state statutes have passed with
overwhelming support in the states that have addressed the issue, further
compelling the notion that "today our society views mentally retarded
offenders as categorically less capable than the average criminal."'"
10 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311-12 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)). The
Eighth Amendment states, "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
101 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 322-23.
102Id. at 313 (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982)) (emphasis
removed).
103 Id. at 312.
104 Id. at 313.
1o5 Id.
106 Id. at 314.
107 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
10' Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314-15. The state of Maryland enacted legislation prohibiting
mentally retarded offenders from being sentenced to death in 1989 while the Penry case was
being decided.
09 Id. at 315.
110 Id. at 315-16.
I.. ld. at 316.
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Beyond legislation, the statistics show that since 1989, only five executions
have been carried out on mentally retarded individuals. 1 2 Combining these
factors, the Court concludes that "[t]he practice . . . has become truly
unusual, and it is fair to say that a national consensus has developed against
it.,,113
In a footnote, the Court considers the viewpoints of the world
community, religious organizations and professional organizations. 1 4 The
Court finds persuasion in the conglomeration of professional organizations
that have filed amicus briefs in various death penalty cases.' 5  The
American Psychological Association and the American Association on
Mental Retardation (AAMR) both have adopted official positions against
sentencing mentally retarded offenders to death."16  Multiple religious
organizations wrote together to oppose the practice, with the Court noting
that "though their views about the death penalty differ, they all 'share a
conviction that the execution of persons with mental retardation cannot be
morally justified.""' 7 The European Union filed on behalf of multiple
countries in opposition to the practice." 8 Polling data submitted by the
AAMR shows a "widespread consensus among Americans, even those who
support the death penalty, that executing the mentally retarded is wrong."' 19
Although the statements of these organizations are in no way dispositive,
the "consistency with the legislative evidence lends further support to our
conclusion that there is a consensus among those who have addressed the
issue. ' ' 2
Justice Stevens states that the legal dispute is not whether the practice
of executing mentally retarded offenders should be legal, but in who
qualifies as mentally retarded.12' "Not all people who claim to be mentally
retarded will be so impaired as to fall within the range of mentally retarded
offenders about whom there is a national consensus.' 22 The Court declines
to define the term "mentally retarded," stating, "we leave to the State[s] the
112 Id. In making this statistical determination, the Court looks to executions of people
with an IQ less than seventy.
113 id.
i4 Id. at 316 n.21.
115 id.
116 id.
117 Id. (citing Brief of Amici Curiae United States Catholic Conference et al. at 2,








task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction
upon their execution of sentences."
23
After evaluating the national consensus against the practice of
executing mentally retarded individuals evidenced by the objective indicia,
the Court turns to an examination of how the reduced capacity of mentally
retarded persons justifies exclusion from the death penalty. 24 The Court
first discusses whether the practice of executing mentally retarded offenders
accomplishes the goals of the death penalty: retribution and deterrence.
25
"Unless the imposition of the death penalty on a mentally retarded person
'measurably contributes to one or both of these goals, it is nothing more
than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering,' and
hence an unconstitutional punishment."' 
26
The relative culpability of mentally retarded offenders determines
whether retribution is served by allowing the sentence of death. 27 While
"[m]entally retarded persons frequently know the difference between right
and wrong and are competent to stand trial," the impairments associated
with being mentally retarded are such that personal culpability is
diminished. 28 "There is no evidence that they are more likely to engage in
criminal conduct than others, but there is abundant evidence that they often
act on impulse rather than pursuant to a premeditated plan, and that in
group settings they are followers rather than leaders."'' 29  Precedent
establishes that only the most heinous of offenders are to be sentenced to
death. 30 "If the culpability of the average murderer is insufficient to justify
the most extreme sanction available to the State, the lesser culpability of the
mentally retarded offender surely does not merit that form of retribution."'
31
In evaluating the deterring effect of the death sentence for mentally
retarded offenders, the Court looks to Enmund, stating that "capital
punishment can serve as a deterrent only when murder is the result of
premeditation and deliberation."' 3 2  The deterrence theory in capital
123 Id. (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 416 (1986)) (alteration in original).
This is the same approach the Court took when they outlawed execution of the insane.
124 Id. at 318.
125 Id. at 319-20.
126 Id. at 319 (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982)).
127 Id. at 318.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 319. See Godrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980) (setting aside the
sentence of death for an offender whose crimes did not show "a consciousness materially
more 'depraved' than that of any person guilty of murder").
13, Id. at 319.
132 Id. (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 799 (1982)).
[Vol. 93
ATKINS v. VIRGINIA
sentencing is based on the idea that increasingly serious consequences (such
as death) will discourage the criminal contemplating murder., 33 However,
because of the "cognitive and behavioral impairments" of the mentally
retarded, this deterring effect is lost. 134 Because they suffer from a
"diminished ability to understand and process information, to learn from
experience, to engage in logical reasoning, or to control impulses," mentally
retarded offenders are not deterred from committing murder by the possible
consequence of being sentenced to death.'35
The Court also looks at how the mentally retarded offender's
culpability affects the sentencing process.
The risk "that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which may call for
a less severe penalty," is enhanced, not only by the possibility of false confessions,
but also by the lesser ability of mentally retarded defendants to make a persuasive
showing of mitigation in the face of prosecutorial evidence of one or more
aggravating factors.'
36
This argument is bolstered by at least one conviction of a mentally
retarded individual that was recently overturned when it was discovered that
the individual had confessed to a crime in which he was not involved. 37
Mentally retarded individuals are also less likely to be helpful to their own
counsel in mounting a defense, make poor witnesses, and are not prone to
showing remorse in the courtroom. 38  These factors may enhance the
likelihood that a jury will sentence the retarded offender to death when an
average individual would receive a lesser sentence.139 The Court also looks
at Penry, where it was shown that jurors considered the offender's mental
retardation to be indicative of future dangerousness (and thus an
aggravating rather than mitigating factor in the sentencing equation) and
sentenced the offender to death.140
Because of the consensus national opinion against the execution of
mentally retarded individuals and the lack of a deterring and retributive
effect of the possibility of death, the Court concluded that "such
punishment is excessive" and therefore unconstitutional under the Eighth
Amendment.141
113 Id. at 320.
134 id.
135 id.
136 Id. (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978)).
137 Id. at 320 n.25.
38 Id. at 320-21.
139 See id.
140 Id. at 321. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 323-25 (1989).
14' Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
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2. The Dissenting Opinions
a. Rehnquist's Dissent
Chief Justice Rehnquist (joined by Scalia and Thomas) writes
separately to argue against the majority's reliance on "foreign laws, the
views of professional and religious organizations, and opinion polls.'
42
This reliance has little basis in precedent and goes against all notions of
federalism in the Constitution. 43 While Rehnquist acknowledges that the
Court has recognized the influence of international viewpoints in previous
cases, "[the Court has] since explicitly rejected the idea that the sentencing
practices of other countries could 'serve to establish the first Eighth
Amendment prerequisite, that [a] practice is accepted among our
people."",144  This precedent developed, because "if it is evidence of a
national consensus for which we are looking, then the viewpoints of other
countries simply are not relevant."'145 Rehnquist criticizes the majority's
reliance on expressed viewpoints of religious organizations, stating "none
should be accorded any weight on the Eighth Amendment scale when the
elected representatives of a State's populace have not deemed them
persuasive enough to prompt legislative action."'
146
Of particular concern for the Chief Justice is the majority's "blind
faith" acceptance of the opinion polls proffered by the petitioner and
various outside organizations. 47  "An extensive body of social science
literature describes how methodological and other errors can affect the
reliability and validity of estimates about the opinions and attitudes of a
population derived from various sampling techniques."'' 48 Any opinion poll
data should have been offered at trial, where the results could have been
examined and cross-examined. 49 Rehnquist considers the polls flawed for
reasons such as the questions asked by those conducting the polls, the polls
failure to disclose the population that was sampled, the sampling
techniques, who conducted the poll or why the poll was conducted. 50 All
142 Id. at 322 (Rehnquist, C.., dissenting).
143 Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
144 Id. at 325 (Rehnquist, C., dissenting) (quoting Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361,
369 n.1 (1989)).
145 Id. (Rehnquist, C.., dissenting).
146 Id. at 326 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
147 Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
148 Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
149 Id. at 327-28 (Rehnquist, C., dissenting).
150 Id. at 327 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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of these issues could have affected the objectivity of the results of the
polling. 5'
Instead, the Court should look solely to "the work product of
legislatures and sentencing jury determinations" to "ascertain the
contemporary American conceptions of decency for purposes of the Eighth
Amendment. ' 5 "[I]n a democratic society legislatures, not courts, are
constituted to respond to the will and consequently the moral values of the
people."' 53 The Court also should give more deference to jury verdicts as
indicative of society's views because of the "jury's intimate involvement in
the case and its function of 'maintain[ing] a link between contemporary
community values and the penal system."" 5 4  Rehnquist takes particular
issue with the majority's refusal to acknowledge that neither petitioner nor
the amici had presented "comprehensive statistics that would conclusively
prove (or disprove) whether juries routinely consider death a
disproportionate punishment for mentally retarded offenders."' 5
b. Scalia's Dissent
Justice Scalia (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas)
writes a scathing dissent, characterizing the majority's decision as "an
opinion . . . rest[ing] upon nothing but the personal views of its
Members."' 156 The only way that a punishment could be considered "cruel
and unusual," is to either fit within the definition of "cruel and unusual" at
the time the Constitution was written, or be "inconsistent with modem
'standards of decency,' as evinced by objective indicia, the most important
of which is 'legislation enacted by the country's legislatures."",157 Because
the majority does not argue that execution of mentally retarded individuals
was considered "cruel and unusual" at the time of the writing of the
Constitution, this issue is not addressed. 5 8 Instead, Scalia concentrates his
151 Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
152 Id. at 324 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
153 Id. at 323 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
383 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)).
154 Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 181 (1976)
(joint opinion of Stewart, Powell and Stevens, JJ.)).
155 Id. (Rehnquist, CI., dissenting). The dissent also expressed doubt about the existence
of any such statistics. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
116 Id. at 338 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
' Id. at 339-40 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330-31
(1989)).
158 Id. at 340 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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argument on the majority's use of the recently enacted legislation to find a
national consensus against execution of mentally retarded offenders. 159
Scalia looks at the legislation passed in eighteen states prohibiting the
execution of mentally retarded offenders in a completely different manner
than the majority. 60 He notes that only forty-seven percent, eighteen out of
the thirty-eight states that allow executions, had outlawed executions of
mentally retarded individuals.1 6' Also, because only seven of those
eighteen states allowed for the legislation to be applied retroactively, the
legislation "is not a statement of absolute moral repugnance, but one of
current preference between two tolerable approaches."' 162 Additionally, two
states have stipulations within their laws that allow for the imposition of the
death penalty upon certain mentally retarded offenders. 163 Finally, Scalia
takes issue with the time frame of the passing of these eighteen statutes.
64
After breaking down how long each had been in existence (the longest of
which was fourteen years), he states that "[i]t is 'myopic to base sweeping
constitutional principles upon the narrow experience of [a few] years."",165
For the sake of argument, Scalia accepts the questionable figure of
eighteen for how many states have legislation outlawing the execution of
mentally retarded offenders.' 66 "That bare number of States alone-18-
should be enough to convince any reasonable person that no 'national
consensus' exists. How is it possible that agreement among 47% of the
death penalty jurisdictions amounts to 'consensus' ?,167 Scalia compares the
majority's definition of a "consensus" with past Supreme Court findings.' 68
Previous decisions had determined that a consensus existed when all but
one state was punishing an offender in a certain way or when seventy-eight
percent of states had decided in a certain manner. 69 The instant case is
159 Id. at 341-42 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
160 Id. at 342 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
161 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
162 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
163 Id. at 342-43 (Scalia, J., dissenting). "Kansas apparently permits execution of all
except the severely mentally retarded; New York permits execution of the mentally retarded
who commit murder in a correctional facility." Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
164 Id. at 344 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
165 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584, 614 (1977) (Burger, CI., dissenting)).
166 Id. at 343 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
161 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
161 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
169 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). See Coker, 433 U.S. at 595-96 (invalidating death penalty
for a rapist because Georgia was the only state that had this sentencing scheme); Solem v.
Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 300 (1983) (invalidating life sentence for repeat offender because his
sentence was more severe than it would have been in any other jurisdiction); Ford v.
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more closely related to situations where the Court had failed to find the
existence of a consensus, such as when thirty percent and forty-two percent
of the states were aligned.17
0
After breaking apart the statistics for "consensus" upon which the
majority opinion was based, Scalia moves on to criticize the majority's
reliance on the direction of the change as persuasive.' 71 "Given that 14
years ago all the death penalty statues included the mentally retarded, any
change ... was bound to be in the one direction the Court finds significant
enough to overcome the lack of real consensus."' 172 Scalia cautions against
reliance on any trend by recounting how public opinion towards the death
penalty in general has swayed through the years.1
73
Scalia also questions the reliance by the majority on the "margins by
which state legislatures have enacted bans on execution of the retarded" as
indicative of their conviction against the topic. 74 The majority relies upon
"the fact that 49% of the legislators in a State with a population of 60
million voted against the bill should be more impressive than the fact that
90% of the legislators in a State with a population of 2 million voted for
it.' ' 175 Scalia characterizes this pattern of reasoning as "absurd," stating that
"the Eighth Amendment is a consensus of the same sort as the consensus
that adopted the Eighth Amendment: a consensus of the sovereign States
that form the Union, not a nose count of Americans for and against.", 
76
Scalia questions the validity of the statistics that the majority used to
show that executions of mentally retarded persons are rare.' 77  Two
different sources reported that twelve states had executed thirty-five
allegedly mentally retarded offenders from 1984-2000, and that ten percent
of all individuals currently on death row are retarded. 78  Scalia also
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 408 (1986) (disallowing the execution of insane offenders
because no state permits it).
70 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 343-44 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S.
137, 158 (1987) (upholding state law that allowed an offender convicted of felony murder to
be sentenced to death because only thirty percent of the death penalty states prohibited such
a sentence); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (allowing execution of a
sixteen-year-old because only forty-two percent of states prohibited death for such an
offender).
17' Atkins, 536 U.S. at 344 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
172 Id. at 344-45 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
73 Id. at 345 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 854-
855 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
174 Id. at 346 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
... Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
176 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
177 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
78 Id. at 346-47 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing D. Keyes et al., People with Mental
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construes the scarcity of executions of mentally retarded offenders
differently than the majority. 79 Instead of being indicative of society's
complete abhorrence of the practice, the scarcity can be characterized as
showing that prosecutors and juries believe that the death penalty should
rarely be imposed on mentally retarded offenders' 8 0
The dismantling of the majority's "consensus" moves on with Scalia
awarding the "Prize for the Court's Most Feeble Effort to fabricate 'national
consensus"' to the reliance on "the views of assorted professional and
religious organizations, members of the so-called 'world community,' and
respondents to opinion polls."'' Scalia restates his approval of Chief
Justice Rehnquist's dissent calling these views "irrelevant."' 8 2 "We must
never forget that it is a Constitution for the United States of America that
we are expounding . . . . [W]here there is not first a settled consensus
among our own people, the views of other nations ... cannot be imposed
upon Americans through the Constitution."'
8 3
Scalia disagrees with the majority's conclusion that the Eighth
Amendment fundamentally prohibits "excessive punishments."'' 8 4  The
Eighth Amendment was not written to prevent "excessive punishments,"
but rather to forbid "always-and-everywhere 'cruel' punishments, such as
the rack and the thumbscrew."' 8 5  The death penalty for the mentally
retarded does not fit into this category because it is not considered to be
cruel everywhere or on everyone. Not every state has declared the practice
cruel, nor is "[t]he Eighth Amendment... a ratchet, whereby a temporary
consensus on leniency for a particular crime fixes a permanent
constitutional maximum, disabling the States from giving effect to altered
beliefs and responding to changed social conditions."'8 6
Scalia also criticizes the majority's argument that juries are unable to
account for an offender's mental retardation, as well as the characterization
Retardation Are Dying Legally, 35 MENTAL RETARDATION (Feb. 1977); Bonner & Rimer,
Executing the Mentally Retarded Even as Laws Begin to Shift, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2000, at
Al).
179 Id. at 347 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
s id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
i Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
182 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
183 Id. at 348 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868-
69 n.4 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
184 Id. at 349 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
185 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
186 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 990 (1991)).
It is apparent from the oral arguments that Scalia is concerned with ratcheting up the
standards surrounding the death penalty, as once precedent has been established states are
precluded from making individual decisions based upon their needs and desires.
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of retarded individuals as being "no more culpable" than the average
offender. 187  "[W]hat scientific analysis can possibly show that a mildly
retarded individual who commits an exquisite torture-killing is 'no more
culpable' than the 'average' murderer in a holdup-gone-wrong or a
domestic dispute?"' 8  Culpability depends not only upon the offender's
mental condition but also upon the depravity of the crime, and this is
"precisely why this sort of question has traditionally been thought
answerable not by a categorical rule of the sort the Court today imposes
upon all trials, but rather by the sentencer's weighing of the
circumstances."' 8 9 The majority's blanket prohibition on the imposition of
the death penalty on mentally retarded offenders misplaces the power of
judgment. 90 "[O]nly the sentencer can assess whether [the offender's]
retardation reduces his culpability enough to exempt him from the death
penalty for the particular murder in question.' 9'
Scalia logically breaks apart the majority's argument that mentally
retarded offenders are not deterred from commission of murders by the
threat of a death sentence.192 The assumption that retarded individuals are
less likely to be deterred by a possible punishment leads to the conclusion
"that the mentally retarded (because they are less deterred) are more likely
to kill.' ' 193 Because this conclusion is patently untrue, the precepts cannot
be valid. 194 The majority doesn't claim that all retarded offenders can not
appreciate the possibility of a death sentence, so "surely the deterrent effect
of a penalty is adequately vindicated if it successfully deters many, but not
all, of the target class."' 95  Instead of precluding all mentally retarded
offenders from being sentenced to death,
we should treat a mentally retarded murderer the way we treat an offender who may
be 'less likely' to respond to the death penalty because he was abused as a child. We
do not hold him immune from capital punishment, but require his background to be
considered ... as a mitigating factor.
196
In conclusion, Scalia laments over the Court's multiple procedural and
substantive exceptions to the death penalty under their "death-is-different"
187 Id. at 349-50 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
188 Id. at 350 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
9 Id. at 350-51 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
190 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
191 Id. at 351 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
192 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
193 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
194 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
"9 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).




jurisprudence. 97 "There is something to be said for popular abolition of the
death penalty; there is nothing to be said for its incremental abolition by this
Court."'198 Because many of the components of the definition of mental
retardation can be faked, the majority's decision will turn "the process of
capital trial into a game. ' 199 Under this decision, faking retardation comes
without consequence.200 Scalia dissents from the blanket ban on execution
of mentally retarded offenders, preferring to leave the sentencing decision
to the jury.20'
IV. ANALYSIS
A. CONSENSUS OR NOT?
The Supreme Court first established that the best indicator of the
modem perception of "evolving standards of decency" is legislation in
Coker v. Georgia.202 Since this case, current state laws have been the main
consideration in the Court's attempt to determine the country's stance on
various intricacies of the death penalty.20 3 This analytical pattern was
continued in the Atkins decision.204
1. A Comparison of the Atkins' Consensus with Previously Determined
Cases Involving a National Consensus
In Coker, the Court evaluated the legislation regarding the possible
sentences for a person found guilty of the rape of an adult.205 At the time,
only Georgia allowed an offender to be sentenced to death.206 The Court
was persuaded by this fact, but also by the trend in legislation over the
previous ten years.20 7 Only five years prior to the decision in Coker,
Furman v. Georgia was handed down, effectively invalidating every state
'9' Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
198 Id. at 353 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
'99 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
200 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). This is contrasted to the feigning of insanity where, under
Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 370 n.20 (1983), the offender can be committed until
cured, then tried and executed.
201 Id. at 354 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
202 See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593 (1977).
203 See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487
U.S. 817, 826-29 (1988); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 789-93 (1982).
204 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312.
205 Coker, 433 U.S. at 594-96.
206 Id. at 595-96.
207 Id. at 594-96.
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death penalty statute. 2°8 At that time, sixteen states allowed an offender
convicted of the rape of an adult to be sentenced to death.20 9 In the wake of
Furman, every state was forced to re-evaluate their sentencing scheme to
comply with the new standards.21 ° While thirty-five states re-instated the
death penalty for certain specific crimes, only three states included rape
amongst their capital offenses. 21 Thus, thirteen states evaluated their death
penalty statutes and eliminated rape from those offenses eligible for capital
punishment. When two of the three capital rape state statutes were
invalidated by Woodson v. North Carolina,212 Georgia was the sole
jurisdiction left that allowed for a sentence of death when the rape victim
was an adult woman.21 3
Beyond legislation, the Court also looked to jury verdicts as objective
indicators of society's views.214 They determined that only six juries in
Georgia had sentenced rapists to death between 1973 and 1977; nine times
out of ten, death was not imposed. 215 This evidence showed that a national
consensus had developed against the punishment of death for an offender
convicted of the rape of an adult.
216
In Enmund v. Florida, similar (albeit more complicated) statistics
existed relating to the death sentence for an individual who had neither
killed nor contemplated death in their offense.21 7 The Court looked at the
thirty-six states that had death penalty statutes in place in 1982.218 Of these
thirty-six, felony murder was not a capital offense in four of the states.219
Another state rejected outright death for an offender who did not commit
the actual murder.220 Eleven more states had culpability requirements in
their capital murder sentencing schemes, requiring the prosecutor to prove
that the offender had some degree of culpability for the murder.221 Nine
208 Id. at 593.
209 id.
210 Id.
211 Id. at 593-94.
212 428 U.S. 280, 301 (1976). In Louisiana and North Carolina, death was the mandatory
penalty for rape; Woodson established the requirement of individualized sentencing for death
penalty jurisdictions.
213 Coker, 433 U.S. at 595-96.
214 Id. at 596.
215 Id. at 597.
216 Id. at 596.
217 458 U.S. 782, 789-90 (1982).
28 Id. at 789.
219 id.
220 Id. at 791.
221 Id. at 789. The actual degree of culpability varied in different jurisdictions. Eight
states required the prosecutor to prove the offender's culpability was at the level of
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other states had statutes that did not allow for the death penalty when an
offender had merely participated in a felony and did not cause the death of
the victim. 222 These states considered the offender's minor role in the crime
as a mitigating circumstance and thus, without culpability as an aggravator,
death could not be imposed.223 Two jurisdictions did not allow for death
when the defendant played only a minor role in the crime.224 Another
state's definition of capital felony murder was so narrow that the facts of
the Enmund case did not apply.225  This left only eight jurisdictions that
would have allowed Enmund to be sentenced to death.226
The trend of enacted legislation was also compelling to the Court.227
"[O]f the eight states which have enacted new death penalty statutes since
1978, none authorize capital punishment in such circumstances., 228 The
Court looked past the legislation to the jury verdicts and found that out of
362 individuals executed since 1954, only six people who were not the
actual triggermen in felony murder cases were put to death and all six of
"knowing, intentional, purposeful, or premeditated killing." Id. See ALA. CODE §§ 13A-2-
23, 13A-5-40(a)(2), 13A-6-2(a)(1) (1977 & Supp. 1982) (to be found guilty of capital
murder, accomplice must have had "intent to promote or assist the commission of the
offense" and murder must be intentional); 38 ILL. COMP. STAT. 9/1(a)(3), 9/1(b)(6) (1979)
(capital crime only if defendant killed intentionally or with knowledge that his actions
"created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
14:30(1) (West Supp. 1982) ("intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm"); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 30-2-1(A)(1), 31-18-14(A), 31-20A-5 (Supp. 1981) (felony murder is a capital crime but
death penalty may not be imposed absent intent to kill unless victim was a peace officer);
OHio REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2903.01(B), (C), (D), 2929.02(A), 2929.04(A)(7) (1982)
(accomplice not guilty of capital murder unless he intended to kill); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§§ 19.02(a), 19.03(a)(2) (1974) ("intentionally commits the murder in the course of [a
felony]"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(1) (1978) ("intentionally or knowingly causes the
death of another"); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31 (1982) ("The willful, deliberate, and
premeditated killing of any person in the commission of robbery or attempted robbery.").
The remaining three required something less, more similar to "reckless or extreme
indifference to human life." Enmund, 458 U.S. at 789. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 41-
1501(l)(a) (1977) ("extreme indifference to ... life"); see also § 41-1501, Commentary ("an
inadvertent killing in the course of a felony will not... support ... a conviction entailing
punishment by death"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 636(a)(2), (6) (1979) ("recklessly" or
"with criminal negligence" causes death during the commission of a felony); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 507.020(l)(b) (Supp. 1980) (defendant must manifest "extreme indifference to
human life" and "wantonly engage" in conduct which creates a grave risk of death ... and
thereby causes ... death").
222 Enmund, 458 U.S. at 791.
223 Id. at 792.
224 Id. at 791.
225 id.





these executions were in 1955.229 Only sixteen individuals out of the 739
offenders then on death row had been sentenced to die for murders
committed when they were not physically present.230 Of this sixteen, only
three (including Enmund) had not hired or conspired to hire someone else




Percentage that Would Allow
Case the Death Penalty for the Outcome
Respective Offender
Coker v. Georgia 3% (1 state out of 35) Unconstitutional
Enmund v. Florida 22% (8 states out of 36) Unconstitutional
Atkins v. Virginia 46% (18 jurisdictions out of Unconstitutional
1 1__ _ 3 9)232 1
In Atkins, the totality of the state legislation with regard to mentally
retarded offenders was not nearly as unbalanced as in Coker or Enmund.233
At the time of this decision, at least eighteen of the thirty-nine death penalty
jurisdictions implicitly allowed mentally retarded offenders to be sentenced
to death.234 Under Supreme Court precedent, if the majority decision in
Atkins was based purely on numbers of states with the requisite legislation,
the decision would have been wrongly decided. However, Stevens did not
rely only on the numerical data; the trend of the legislation was extremely
persuasive to him.2 35 The Atkins decision, therefore, is in line with Coker
and Enmund with respect to this facet of the analysis. 236 The majority in
Atkins was persuaded by the fact that since the Penry decision was handed
down in 1989, eighteen states had enacted legislation precluding the
mentally retarded from eligibility for the death penalty.237 Not a single
229 Id. at 794-95.
230 Id.
231 id.
232 This number includes the federal jurisdiction.
233 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313-16; Enmund, 458 U.S. at 789-93; Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584, 593-96 (1977).
234 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 342 (Scalia, J., dissenting). These statistics are uncertain because
of the various legislative requirements that established what constituted mental retardation.
In Atkins, the Court left it to the states to determine the level of retardation necessary to
exclude an offender from eligibility for the death penalty. Id. at 313.
235 Id, at 313-17.
236 See Ennund, 458 U.S. at 793-95; Coker, 433 U.S. at 594-95.
237 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313-16.
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jurisdiction had gone the other way, expressly permitting mentally retarded
individuals to be sentenced to death under their sentencing schemes.
238
However, the majority does not address the fact that even with this trend of
legislation, only twenty of the thirty-nine death penalty jurisdictions (forty-
six percent) have excluded mentally retarded offenders from death within
their sentencing schemes.239 This is less than half of the states that had
240previously been required to establish a national consensus.
2. A Comparison of the Death Penalty Age-Related Cases and Atkins-The
"Numerator /Denominator Game"
The consensus debate has most recently been visited by the Court with
regard to the treatment of juvenile offenders under the death penalty. 24'
Age-related death penalty cases are a compelling comparison to the cases of
mentally retarded offenders like Atkins because the states legislation is
similarly aligned. 42 The debate between the majority and dissent in Atkins
relating to legislative statistics originated when the Court confronted the
issue of a minimum age for eligibility for the death penalty.243 The Court's
statistics battle can be described as the "Numerator / Denominator
Game.",244 The Numerator / Denominator Game is the debate over which
states should be included in percentage calculations when evaluating the
objective indicia of the "evolving standards of decency" in current
society.245  One issue in this game is whether the denominator should
include all fifty states, D.C., and the federal jurisdiction or only the so-
called death states (states with active death penalty sentencing schemes).246
Another aspect of this game is whether the Court should draw inferences
238 Id.
239 Id. at 316.
240 Id.
241 See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369-73 (1989); Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 817, 826-30 (1988).
242 See, e.g., Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315-17; Stanford, 492 U.S. at 369-73; Thompson, 487
U.S. at 826-30.
243 Stanford, 492 U.S. at 369-73.
244 Norman J. Finkel, Prestidigitation, Statistical Magic, and Supreme Court
Numerology in Juvenile Death Penalty Cases, I PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y. & L. 612, 624
(1995).
245 id.
246 The calculations done in this analysis assume that the District of Columbia and the
federal jurisdiction are treated equally with the fifty states resulting in a maximum
denominator of fifty-two.
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from a state's inaction towards a particular issue otherwise known as the
explicit v. implicit distinction.247
In Thompson v. Oklahoma, the Court found that there was a national
consensus against executing an offender who was under the age of sixteen
at the time of the crime.248 When the Court was deciding this case, fourteen
jurisdictions (twenty-nine percent) did not allow the death penalty at all,
nineteen states (thirty-seven percent) had no explicit minimum age, and the
remaining eighteen states (thirty-five percent) had minimum ages ranging
from sixteen to eighteen.
249
To bolster his argument for a national consensus, Stevens argued
if ... we accept the premise that some offenders are simply too young to be put to
death, it is reasonable to put [the non-death states and states without a minimum age
in the sentencing scheme] to one side because they do not focus on the question of
where the chronological age line should be drawn.
This reasoning allowed him to remove thirty-three states (the fourteen states
that did not allow the death penalty at all and the nineteen implicit states-
those that had not expressly set a minimum age for executions) from both
the numerator and the denominator in the statistical calculations.25' One
hundred percent of the remaining eighteen states had set the baseline to
exclude offenders under the age of sixteen.252
The dissent, written by Scalia, argued that the nineteen states without a
minimum age in their sentencing schemes "are of the view that death is not
different insofar as the age of juvenile criminal responsibility is
concerned. ''253 Thus, a majority (nineteen out of thirty-seven or fifty-one
percent) of the death penalty states allowed for the possible execution of
offenders under the age of sixteen.
254
247 See Finkel, supra note 244, at 624. For example, justices have previously reasoned
that a non-death penalty state has, by outlawing the punishment altogether, taken a clear
stance against the death penalty for juvenile offenders and used that state in their statistics
calculations. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 817, 828-29 (1988).
248 Thompson, 487 U.S. at 838.
249 Id. at 826-29.
250 Id. at 828-29.
25 1 Finkel, supra note 244, at 626. In doing this, Stevens ignored the fact that in some of
these states, fifteen-year-olds were eligible to be tried for first degree murder and thus could
be sentenced to death. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 868 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
252 Thompson, 487 U.S. at 829.
253 Id. at 868 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
254 Id. at 867-68 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Whether or not an offender would be sentenced
to death in each of these states depends on the juvenile transfer statutes, not on the death




Comparison of Reasoning used by Stevens and Scalia
in Thompson v. Oklahoma
States that would not
execute a 15 year old Percentage
Numerator (Explicit Age Death
5 Penalty States) 18
> '100V Denominator (Explicit AgeV) Death Penalty States) _8
Numerator (Explicit Age Death 8
Penalty States) 49
Denominator (All Death Penalty 37
States)
At the time Stanford v. Kentucky was decided, fifteen jurisdictions
(twenty-nine percent) did not have the death penalty, twelve (twenty-three
percent) states' capital sentencing schemes had a minimum age of eighteen,
and in another three (six percent) the minimum age was seventeen. 5 The
majority in Stanford used these statistics to conclude that only thirty-two
percent (twelve out of thirty-seven) of states excluded a seventeen-year-old
offender from being sentenced to death.256 Similarly, under the majority's
reasoning, only forty-one percent (fifteen out of thirty-seven) disallowed the
execution of a sixteen-year-old.257 The denominator used by the majority
was thirty-seven, all of the jurisdictions that allowed the death penalty at
this time.25 8 The Court held that this percentage "does not establish the
degree of national consensus this Court has previously thought sufficient to
label a particular punishment cruel and unusual. 259
In dissent, Brennan takes these same numbers and comes up with two
very different results. 260 Brennan included all fifty states as well as the
federal jurisdiction and the District of Columbia in his denominator,
totaling fifty-two.26 1  For the numerator, he combined the states that
outlawed the death penalty outright with those states whose sentencing
schemes included a minimum age.262 The result of this was fifty-four




259 Id. at 370-71.
260 Id. at 384 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
261 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
262 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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percent (twenty-eight out of fifty-two) 263 did not allow a seventeen-year-old
to be executed and sixty percent (thirty-one out of fifty-two) precluded the
execution of a sixteen-year-old offender.264
Table 3
Comparison of Statistical Reasoning in Stanford v. Kentucky
States that would not
execute a 16 year old Percentage
Numerator (states with 15Cd15
minimum age of 17) 41
L Denominator (all death penalty 37
states)
= Numerator (non-death states and
states with minimum age of 17) 60= 0
E Denominator (all fifty states,
_ 
D.C. and federal) 52
States that would not
execute a 17 year old Percentage
Numerator 12
Denominator (all death penalty 32C/ states) 37
= Numerator 28
Denominator (all fifty states, 60
D.C. and federal) 52
Brennan went further with his statistics game by eliminating the
nineteen states that had not explicitly set a minimum age for executions
from both the numerator and denominator. 265 "[D]ecisions of legislatures
that are only implicit ... lack the 'earmarks of careful consideration that we
have required for other kinds of decision leading to the death penalty' [and
therefore] must count for little., 266 With only thirty-three jurisdictions for
the denominator, the statistics revealed that ninety-four percent of the
263 The number twenty-eight includes the federal jurisdiction and the District of
Columbia.
264 Finkel, supra note 244, at 624.
265 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 385 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
266 Id. at 385 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 817,
857 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
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jurisdictions would not allow a sixteen-year-old and eighty-five percent
would not allow a seventeen-year-old to be executed.267
If this statistical game is applied to the death penalty legislation
concerning treatment of mentally retarded offenders, it becomes clear that
the majority's consensus in Atkins establishes a new definition of "national
consensus." 268 Taking a baseline look at the statutory statistics, eighteen
states and the federal jurisdiction disallow mentally retarded offenders to be
executed.269 Dividing this number by the forty death penalty jurisdictions,
the result is forty-eight percent of the possible death jurisdictions do not
allow imposition of the death penalty on mentally retarded individuals.
270
This number is similar to the results (forty-one percent for sixteen-year-olds
and thirty-two percent for seventeen-year-olds) found inadequate for a
consensus by the majority in Stanford.27'
The majority in Thompson held that eighteen states (out of a possible
thirty-seven death penalty jurisdictions) were enough to constitute a
national consensus.272 If eighteen states were enough in Thompson, it
would seem that the nineteen jurisdictions in Atkins should be enough to
find a consensus.2 73 However, the strength of the majority opinion in
Thompson relied on the ability to remove the states that had not expressly
set a minimum age in their sentencing schemes.274 Justice Stevens made the
argument that because the nineteen states had not specifically set a
minimum age, they should be removed from the equation because their
sentencing schemes did not focus on the issue of age.275 This reasoning
doesn't cross over to the legislation faced by the Court in Atkins. Many of
the states that do not exclude mentally retarded offenders from the death
penalty have given explicit consideration to the mental capacity of the
offender as a mitigating factor within the sentencing scheme.276 In devising
their sentencing schemes, these legislatures debated the role that mental
267 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
26' Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316.
... id. at 314-15. Scalia disputes this number by stating that only seven states allow their
statutes to be applied retroactively and thus only seven states truly outlaw all executions of
mentally retarded offenders. Id. at 342 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Also, Scalia points to the two
states that have caveats in the statute allowing for certain offenders to be executed even if
they are mentally retarded. Id. at 342-43 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
270 See Finkel, supra note 244, at 626.
271 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370-71 (1989).
272 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 817, 826-29 (1988).
273 ld.;Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314-15.
274 Thompson, 487 U.S. at 828-29.
275 id.
276 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 322.
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capacity should play in death penalty proceedings and determined that
mental capacity is not a dispositive factor, but merely one to be considered
among other mitigating and aggravating circumstances.277 Because of this
caveat, the twenty jurisdictions that do not explicitly exclude mentally
retarded offenders from eligibility for the death sentence cannot be removed
from statistical calculations.278 This weakens the Atkins decision in relation
to the Thompson decision.
The statutes in Atkins can be evaluated in another way and still fall
short of prior precedent. If you combine the nineteen jurisdictions that
explicitly preclude mentally retarded offenders from being sentenced to
death with the twelve states where the death penalty does not exist, a
majority (sixty-one percent) of jurisdictions do not allow mentally retarded
offenders to be executed. 279 This methodology is similar to that used by the
dissent in Stanford and the results (fifty-four percent and sixty percent in
Stanford) are similar as well. 280  These percentages were not enough to
persuade a majority of the Court to find a national consensus in Stanford
and the Court's reliance on this number in Atkins redefines "national
consensus" within Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.28'
B. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS OF THE ATKINS DECISION-WILL THE
COURT RE-EXAMINE THE MINIMUM AGE FOR THE DEATH
PENALTY?
Following Atkins, the Court will likely come to a different conclusion
the next time it considers the minimum age for the death penalty.282 When
Stanford was handed down in 1989, twelve states had statutory language
that expressly set the minimum age at eighteen.283 Since that time, four
additional states have legislatively raised the bar to eighteen and two state
277 Id. at 322-23 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
278 Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
279 See id. at 314-15. The denominator in this case was fifty-one because the federal
jurisdiction is included in the numerator and thus must be included in the denominator.
280 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 384-85 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
281 ld;Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316.
282 The Court has indicated that it may soon do so. Three Justices (Stevens, Ginsberg
and Breyer) dissented from a denial for a stay of execution for an offender who was
seventeen-years-old at the time he committed murder. In re Toronto M. Patterson, 536 U.S.
984 (2002). Even more recently, Justice Souter joined the other three Justices in dissenting
from a reconsideration of the case involving Stanford himself. In re Kevin Nigel Stanford,
537 U.S. 968 (2002). However, the Court has since denied certiorari to another age-related
death case without issuing an opinion. Hain v. Mullin, 537 U.S. 1173 (2003).
283 Stanford, 492 U.S. at 370.
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supreme courts have effectively done SO. 28 4 Three more states have had bill
pass one of their houses in the last legislative session.285 Considering the
emphasis that the Court put on the trend of legislation in the Atkins
decision, these six states could push the Justices to determine that a national
consensus has developed.286
Amnesty International argues that the Court should follow the
reasoning of the dissent in Stanford.287 The dissent argued that the non-
death penalty states should be included with those that specifically prohibit
juveniles from being eligible for the death penalty. 288 Amnesty argues "a
state which does not allow the execution of anyone, juvenile or adult, has
by definition taken a stronger stand against the death penalty than by only
exempting youthful offenders.... ,289 Certainly combining the six states
that have recently prohibited juvenile executions with the twelve that
already set the minimum age at eighteen in 1989 and the thirteen current
abolitionist jurisdictions would cause the Court to find a national
consensus. 29 Under this method of statistical analysis, in the United States
today, sixty percent (thirty-one out of fifty-two) of the jurisdictions do not
allow an offender under the age of eighteen to be sentenced to death.291
Following Atkins, the Supreme Court should find that a national consensus
exists.
292
The Court also noted in Atkins that "the complete absence of States
passing legislation reinstating the power to [execute mentally retarded
offenders] provides powerful evidence that today our society views
mentally retarded offenders as categorically less culpable than the average
criminal. 293 The same can be said for the death penalty and juveniles.294
284 In re Stanford, 537 U.S. at 968-69 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See IND. CODE ANN. §35-
50-2-3, §3(b)(1)(A) (West Supp. 2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. §21-4622 (1995); MONT. CODE
ANN. §45-5-102(2) (2001); N.Y. PENAL LAW §125.27(1)(b) (McKinney 2003); State v.
Furman, 858 P.2d 1092, 1103 (Wash. 1993); State v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 399 (Mo.
2003).
285 Stephen K. Harper, End the Death Penalty Jbr Juveniles, TAMPA TRIB., Sept. 22,
2002.
286 See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316.
287 Indecent and Internationally Illegal: The Death Penalty Against Child Offenders,
AMNESTY INT'L, Sept. 2002, at 5 [hereinafter Child Offenders].
288 Stanford, 492 U.S. at 384 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
289 Child Offenders, supra note 287, at 28.
290 See id.
29' Id. at 29. The fifty-two jurisdictions in this equation include both the District of
Columbia and the Federal jurisdiction.
292 See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316.
293 Id. at 315-16.
... In re Stanford, 537 U.S. 968, 971-72 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Child
1004 [Vol. 93
ATKINS v. VIRGINIA
No state has lowered their minimum age requirement for the death penalty
since Stanford was decided in 1989.295 This argument becomes even
stronger when you consider that the two states that have reinstated the death
penalty (Kansas and New York) both specifically exclude juveniles from
eligibility. 296 Legislation to reinstate the death penalty has been proposed in
at least three other abolitionist states and each of these proposals exempted
individuals under the age of eighteen.297 These states chose this stance in
the face of consistent public pressure to be tough on crime and to lower the
minimum age for children to be prosecuted as adults. 98
Continuing with the reasoning used by the majority in Atkins, jury
verdicts for offenders under the age of eighteen are also telling of a national
consensus against their executions. 299  Of the twenty-one states that
authorize juveniles to be sentenced to death, seven of those states currently
have no juveniles waiting for execution.300 Overall, juveniles make up only
two percent of the overall population of death row. 301 As of August 2002,
fifteen states had a total of eighty-two juvenile offenders on death row but
only six states had actually executed anyone in this category since 1990.302
Arkansas and Delaware have statutes that allow mentally retarded offenders
as well as juveniles to be sentenced to death.3 °3 Both of these states
executed mentally retarded offenders in the years between Penry and Atkins
(Arkansas-two, Delaware-one).3 °4 However, neither of these states has
executed a juvenile offender since 1927 and not a single juvenile offender
has been sentenced to death in Delaware since Furman.30 5 As of July 2000,
only three states (Mississippi, Alabama, and Texas) had more than four
Offenders, supra note 287, at 4.
295 In re Stanford, 537 U.S. at 971 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
296 Child Offenders, supra note 288, at 28.
297 Id. at 29.
298 See id.
299 Id. at 31.
300 Harper, supra note 285. It has been argued that the absence of a juvenile on death
row causes an inherent inertia within that state's legislature. This furthers the contention that
the legislation of a state may not be truly indicative of the viewpoints of the constituency
with regard to the juvenile death penalty. See State v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 410 (Mo.
2003).
311 In re Stanford, 537 U.S. 968, 971-72 (2002) (citing Victor L. Streib, The Juvenile
Death Penalty Today: Death Sentences and Execution for Juvenile Crimes, January 1, 1973-
September 30, 2002, 12, at http://www.law.onu.edu/faculty/streib (updated Oct. 9, 2002)).
302 Bob Dart, Amnesty: Death Penalty for U.S. Youths 'Indecent', ATLANTA JOURNAL-
CONSTITUTION, Sept. 26, 2002.





juveniles on their death row.306 It would seem that "[tihe practice,
therefore, has become truly unusual, and it is fair to say that a national
consensus has developed against it."
307
Following Atkins, it can be safely concluded that the Court has re-
established a precedent of looking to outside sources such as opinion polls,
statements of professional and religious organizations and the international
community in its consensus debate.30 8 If the external perspectives on
mental capacity and the death penalty were strong enough to persuade the
Court in Atkins, they would surely be enough for juveniles and the death
penalty. "The international consensus on the juvenile issue is at least as
strong as on the mental retardation issue, and more explicit in international
treaty law., 30 9  Besides the United States, only Iran, Pakistan, and the
Congo have executed juveniles in the last two years. 310 Pakistan recently
commuted the death sentences of all juvenile offenders and the Congo has
placed a moratorium on such executions. 31' An international treaty entitled
"Convention on the Rights of the Child" includes a prohibition on the
execution of anyone under the age of eighteen.31 2 This treaty has been
ratified by 191 countries since 1989-all of the members of the United
Nations except the United States and Somalia.313 The United States has
signed this treaty but is the only country to specifically exempt itself from
compliance with the juvenile death penalty provision. 314 The United States
306 United States ofAmerica. Crying Out for Clemency. The Case ofA lexander Williams,
Mentally III Child Offender Facing Execution, AMNESTY INT'L, Sept. 2000, at app. 1.
307 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316. Stevens concluded the practice of executing mentally
retarded offenders was "truly unusual" because only five states had executed mentally
retarded individuals since 1989. Id.
308 See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 817, 830-31 (1982); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316
n.21. See generally Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). This contention was
discussed and dismissed in Section V of the majority opinion. Id. However, because Justice
O'Connor wrote separately to express her disagreement with this section, it has no
precedential value. Id. The combination of O'Connor with the four dissenting justices (who
would have the Court consider the outside sources) proves that a majority of the justices are
in favor of this approach. Id.
309 Child Offenders, supra note 287, at 91.
310 Arianna Aryanpur, U.S. Is Urged to Quit Executing Youth Offenders, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 26, 2002, at A21. See also Strieb, supra note 301.
311 Aryanpur, supra note 310. Iran's judiciary has presented a bill to parliament raising
the minimum age for the death penalty to eighteen. Iran Moves Towards Ending Death
Penalty Practices for 15-18 Year Olds, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Sept. 28, 2003.
312 Child Offenders, supra note 287, at 83.
313 Id. at 83-84.
314 Id. at 84.
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has carried out fifty-six percent of the worldwide juvenile executions since
1990 and seventy percent since 1998.315
A recent poll indicated that sixty-nine percent of the American public
opposes the death penalty for juveniles under eighteen and only twenty-six
are in favor of it. 316 These numbers are a complete reversal from a similar
poll taken in 1994, another indicator that there is a societal trend against
juvenile executions. 31 7 Another study, in 2001, found that although sixty-
two percent of those polled were generally in favor of the death penalty,
only thirty-four percent supported it for juvenile offenders. 3t 8 Similar to the
situation in Atkins, multiple professional organizations have adopted an
official stance against juvenile executions. 319
This information should lead the Court to conclude that a "national
consensus" exists against juvenile executions.320 The combination of state
legislation, jury verdicts, polling data, international treaties, and
professional organizations opposed to a juvenile death penalty will likely
lead the Court to reconsider Stanford and establish eighteen as the
minimum age for eligibility for the death penalty.
V. CONCLUSION
In Atkins v. Virginia, the Supreme Court redefined the term "national
consensus" within their Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. The objective
indicia of a "national consensus" relied upon by the Court was nowhere
near the previous benchmark required to find a sentencing practice
35 Id. at 85.
316 Aryanpur, supra note 310.
317 Id. In 1994, the poll announced that sixty-one percent of Americans were in favor of
juvenile execution and thirty percent were opposed to the idea. Id.
318 Child Offenders, supra note 287, at 35.
319 Harper, supra note 285. See also Child Offenders, supra note 287, at 34 (listing
professional organizations that have adopted a stance against execution of offenders that are
under the age of eighteen: American Bar Association, American Psychiatric Association,
American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, American Society for Adolescent
Psychiatry, National Mental Health Association, Children's Defense Fund, Center on
Juvenile and Criminal Justice, Coalition for Juvenile Justice, Child Welfare League of
American, Juvenile Law Center, Mid-Atlantic Juvenile Defender Center, and Youth Law
Center).
320 There have also been studies released in the past few years detailing decreased
psychological development of teenagers. Because my analysis of the Atkins decision was
limited to the objective indicators of a national consensus, these studies were outside of the
scope of this paper. However, the Court will probably consider these studies persuasive in
the realm of juvenile executions not serving a legitimate retributive purpose as juveniles are
less culpable than adults for their actions. See Child Offenders, supra note 287, at 54-80.
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unconstitutional. With this opinion as precedent, the Court should examine
age-related death penalty legislation and overturn Stanford v. Kentucky.32'
Jamie Hughes
32' 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
